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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare 
Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state.”1  This is the operative 
clause of the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) of Kosovo.2  It is 
also the recent concern of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
supreme judicial body of the United Nations (UN).3  The UN General 
Assembly (General Assembly), prompted by a draft resolution submitted by 
Serbia,4 asked the ICJ to exercise its advisory function and determine 
whether the UDI, written by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo (Provisional Institutions), was in accordance with international 
law.5  
In late July 2010, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion answering the 
General Assembly’s question (Kosovo Opinion).6  Rather than accepting the 
General Assembly’s wording of the question, the ICJ investigated whether 
the Provisional Institutions even wrote the UDI.7  The ICJ concluded that the 
Provisional Institutions did not.8  Since the Provisional Institutions did not 
issue the UDI,9 the law that governs Provisional Institutions10 did not govern 
the authors of the UDI.11  Furthermore, because there is no explicit 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Assembly of Kosovo, Kosova Declaration of Indipendence (Feb. 17, 2008) [hereinafter 
Kosovo Declaration of Independence], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/150 
38.pdf (scroll down to page 20 of the document). 
 2 Id. 
 3 MAHASEN M. ALJAGHOUB, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 1946–2005, at 1 (2006). 
 4 Draft Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Whether 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo is in Accordance with International 
Law, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/L.2 (Sept. 23, 2008).  
 5 Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Whether the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo Is in Accordance with International Law 
G.A. Res. 63/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 63/3]. 
 6 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 404 (July 22) [hereinafter Kosovo 
Opinion]. 
 7 Id. at 424, para. 52. 
 8 Id. at 447, para. 109. 
 9 Id. 
 10 For a description of the laws governing the decision in the Kosovo Opinion, see id. at 439–
42, paras. 85–93; S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) [hereinafter SCR 
1244]; Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Constitutional Framework for 
Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001) [hereinafter 
Constitutional Framework], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15034.pdf (scroll 
down to page 121 of the document). 
 11 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 452, paras. 119, 121. 
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prohibition of UDIs in general international law,12 the February 2008 UDI is 
in accordance with international law.13 
This Note will tackle the question: Why did the ICJ rule this way?  The 
ICJ’s objective-oriented adjustment of the General Assembly’s question as 
well as the narrow14 and vague holding do not seem to amount to an 
expansion of international law. However, this Note argues that this decision 
unintentionally developed a new concept of the doctrine of remedial 
secession: the remedial declaration of independence.  The remedial 
declaration of independence could, and in the Kosovo case does, circumvent 
existing international law and impose constitutional frameworks that are 
designed to be temporary, but prove to be immobile.15  Furthermore, this 
Note argues that institutional, doctrinal, and political barriers prevent an 
explicit endorsement of Kosovo’s declaration of independence and that, by 
its declaration, the Republic of Kosovo is an independent and sovereign 
state.  
In Part II, this Note examines the opinion in the Kosovo case itself, first 
by examining the history prior to the opinion’s issue, and then by examining 
both the holding of the opinion and the controversial adjustment of the 
question.  In Part III, this Note surveys international law regarding secession 
and self-determination in international law, and concludes that the practical 
import of the opinion was to give politically frustrated people a legally 
recognizable option for a remedial declaration of independence.  Finally, in 
Part IV, this Note argues that the ICJ championed the most expansive 
doctrine practically available to it without upsetting international laws and 
the political nature of the creation of sovereign states. 
II.  THE KOSOVO OPINION  
The Kosovo Opinion begins with a historical background.  An analysis of 
the opinion should start the same way before moving on to the crucial 
elements of the case: the reformulation of the General Assembly’s question 
and the opinion’s formal holding.   
                                                                                                                   
 12 Id. at 438–39, para. 84. 
 13 Id. at 452, para. 122 (concluding that the adoption of the UDI did not violate any 
applicable rule of international law). 
 14 But see infra notes 57–61 (arguing that the ICJ’s reformulation of the question was a 
grand expansion of ICJ’s jurisdiction).  
 15 For the imposed frameworks and law that govern Kosovo, see Constitutional Framework, 
supra note 10; SCR 1244, supra note 10. 
836 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 40:833 
A.  The Historical Background of the Kosovo Case 
Kosovo is a province in southern Serbia that was granted partial 
autonomy in a Yugoslavian constitution in 1974,16 but was stripped of that 
autonomy in September 1990.17  Kosovo holds historical significance to 
Serbia, as it is the site of the great Serbian defeat at the Battle of Kosovo to 
the Ottoman Turks in 1389.18  In 1999, when Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevich suppressed the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army with force,19 the 
UN Security Council (Security Council) intervened.20  
On June 10, 1999, the Security Council adopted Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (SCR 1244).21  SCR 1244 authorized the UN Secretary-
General (Secretary-General) to establish an interim civil administration in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) that will transition into provisional democratic self-
governing institutions.22  Although Kosovo is to have “substantial self-
government,” SCR 1244 proposed that the final status of Kosovo was to be 
an autonomous part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.23 
On May 15, 2001, the UNMIK issued a Constitutional Framework for 
Provisional Self-Government (Constitutional Framework), which defined the 
responsibilities of the Provisional Institutions.24  As part of that framework, 
“[t]he Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and their officials 
shall . . . [e]xercise their authorities consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 
1244(1999) and the terms set forth in this Constitutional Framework.”25  
Furthermore, the Provisional Institutions was forbidden to affect or diminish 
the Secretary-General’s ability to enforce SCR 1244.26  In other words, the 
Provisional Institutions, which includes the Assembly of Kosovo,27 could not 
decide for itself whether or not it was governed by SCR 1244. 
                                                                                                                   
 16 УСТАВ СОЦИЈАЛИСТИЧКЕ ФЕДЕРАТИВНЕ РЕПУБЛИКЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ [CONSTITUTION OF 
THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA] (1974); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., 
Final Status for Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 7 (2005) (discussing the 1974 Constitution 
and the establishment of Kosovo as an “autonomous province”). 
 17 MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 160 
(1992). 
 18 Id. at 38. 
 19 Perritt, supra note 16, at 8–9. 
 20 Id. at 9. 
 21 SCR 1244, supra note 10. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, ch. 9. 
 25 Id. ch. 2(a). 
 26 Id. ch. 8.1(b). 
 27 Id. ch. 9.1.1.  “The Assembly [of Kosovo] is the highest representative and legislative 
Provisional Institution of Self-Government of Kosovo.”  Id.  It is a proportionally selected 
parliamentary body, chaired by a President, of 120 representatives with three-year terms.  Id. 
ch. 9.1. 
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In a report submitted to the Security Council in 2005, Kai Eide, the 
Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, reviewed the political situation in 
Kosovo and recommended that the final status process envisioned in SCR 
1244 commence.28  The Security Council agreed, but instructed the 
Secretary-General that it would “remain actively seized of the matter.”29  A 
group of nations known as the Contact Group agreed to a set of principles to 
govern the final status process, which included refraining from unilateral 
steps and requiring that the final status of Kosovo should be endorsed by the 
Security Council.30 
Between February 20, 2006 and September 8, 2006, negotiations were 
held between Serbia and Kosovo.31  These talks did not progress.32  By 
March 2007, “the negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable 
outcome on Kosovo’s status [was] exhausted. . . . [T]he conclusion [was] 
that the only viable option for Kosovo [was] independence, to be supervised 
for an initial period by the international community.”33  While the Security 
Council undertook the Kosovo mission, it could not come to a final decision, 
and a draft resolution failed to gain any traction.34 
On November 17, 2007, elections were held for several democratic 
governing organizations in Kosovo.35  The inaugural session of the Assembly 
                                                                                                                   
 28 U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Oct.7, 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/635 (Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter 
U.N. Secretary-General Letter dated Oct. 7, 2005]. 
 29 Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/51 (Oct. 24, 
2005). 
 30 For a list of these principles see U.N. President of the S.C., Letter dated Nov. 10, 2005 
from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. 
Doc. S/2005/709 (Nov. 10, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. President of the S.C. Letter dated Nov. 10, 
2005].  The Contact Group was France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
 31 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/2006/361 (June 5, 2006) (covering the period 
from January 1 to April 30, 2006); U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General 
on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc S/2006/707 (Sept. 
1, 2006) (covering the period from May 1 to August 14, 2006); U.N. Secretary General, 
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/2006/906 (Nov. 20, 2006) (covering the period from August 15 to 
October 31, 2006). 
 32 E.U./U.S./RUSSIA TROIKA ON KOSOVO, REPORT OF THE E.U./U.S./RUSSIA TROIKA ON 
KOSOVO (Dec. 4, 2007) [hereinafter TROIKA REPORT], available at http://www.kosovocompromi 
se.com/cms/item/topic/en.html?view=story&id=343&sectionId=2 (follow the “PDFDownload 
PDF Document” link). 
 33 U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Mar. 26, 2007 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, paras. 3, 5, U.N. Doc. S/2007/168 (Mar. 
26, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General Letter dated Mar. 26, 2007]. 
 34 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 433, para. 71. 
 35 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/2007/768 (Jan. 3, 2008). 
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of Kosovo was held in January 2008.36  On February 17, 2008, the Assembly 
approved the Kosovo Declaration of Independence, issued by “the 
democratically-elected leaders of [the Kosovar] people.”37 
In August 2008, the Permanent Representative of Serbia asked that a 
request for an ICJ advisory opinion be placed on the agenda.38  During the 
debate on the request, the United Kingdom’s representative in the UN called 
Kosovo’s independence “a reality,” and described the request as political 
rather than legal.39  The U.S. voted against the request, but the draft 
resolution was nevertheless adopted 77 votes to 6, with 74 abstentions.40 
On July 22, 2010, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion on the Kosovo 
UDI.41  The opinion was prompted by the approved General Assembly 
Resolution 63/3,42 which requested that the Court answer the following 
question: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international 
law?”43   
B.  The Reformulation of the Question  
A critical element of the Kosovo Opinion is the ICJ’s reformulation of the 
question posed to it by Resolution 63/3.44  The Kosovo case is an exercise of 
the ICJ’s advisory function.  Therefore, the beginning of the decision 
considers whether the ICJ has the jurisdiction to answer the question.45  “The 
ICJ, in accordance with Articles 96 of the UN Charter and 65 of the Court’s 
Statute, may give an advisory opinion upon requests submitted to it by the 
General Assembly, Security Council and by other UN organs and specialized 
                                                                                                                   
 36 U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/2008/211 (Mar. 28, 2008). 
 37 Kosovo Declaration of Independence, supra note 1.  
 38 U.N. General Assembly, Letter dated Aug. 15, 2008 from the Permanent Representative 
of Serbia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/195 (Aug. 
22, 2008). 
 39 U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 22nd plen. mtg. at 2–3, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.22 (Oct. 8, 2008). 
 40 Id. at 11. 
 41 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6. 
 42 G.A. Res. 63/3, supra note 5. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Michael C. Mineiro, The Cowardice of the Restrictive Advisory Opinion Approach: 
A Failure of the Court to Exercise its Judicial Prerogative in the Application of General 
Principles of International Law in Fulfillment of International Peace and Security, 
Memorandum Prepared for the Hague Academy of International Law (Aug. 4, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1654265_code1104261.pdf?a 
bstractid=1654265&mirid=1 (follow the “Download This Paper” link) (“This limitation of the 
question defined the entire advisory opinion.”). 
 45 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 412–23, paras. 17–48. 
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agencies authorized by the General Assembly.”46  The language of the 
question may be found in the appeal of the requesting agency; in the Kosovo 
case, it is the General Assembly and Resolution 63/3.47 
However, the ICJ is not, and has never been, exclusively restricted to the 
question’s language.48  In an exercise of the advisory function of the ICJ, the 
requesting body cannot limit the ICJ’s considerations through the language 
of the question.49  In the Kosovo Opinion, however, the ICJ acknowledges 
that it may, on occasion, depart from the language of the question “where the 
question was not adequately formulated,” where the question does “not 
reflect the ‘legal questions really in issue,’ ” or where the question requires 
clarification.50  In the Kosovo Opinion, the ICJ asserts that it did not depart 
from the language of the question, finding that the question posed to it was 
“narrow and specific.”51  
Rather, the ICJ expands the scope of its inquiry into the question.52  The 
question, again: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with 
international law?”53  The ICJ finds that the General Assembly had no right 
to bind the court into accepting the General Assembly’s identification of the 
authors of the UDI.54  In other words, the General Assembly had no right to 
make the court accept as a predetermined fact that the authors of the UDI 
were the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo.  This 
predetermination is “incompatible” with the ICJ’s advisory function to 
accept the identities of the authors of the UDI; who wrote the UDI was a 
matter capable of affecting the outcome.55  The ICJ supports its decision with 
the legislative history of Resolution 63/3:56 the debate over the resolution did 
not include considerations of the author of the UDI, nor did the resolution’s 
original wording contain a reference to the author of the UDI.57  
                                                                                                                   
 46 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 3, at 38. 
 47 G.A. Res. 63/3, supra note 5. 
 48 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 3, at 56–57. 
 49 Id. at 57. 
 50 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 423, para. 50. 
 51 Id. at 423–24, para. 51 (citing Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 
Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, para. 35 (Dec. 20)). 
 52 Elena Cirkovic, An Analysis of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence, 11 GERMAN L.J. 895, 898 (2010)  (“The ICJ reformulated the 
question regarding Kosovo’s independence in a way that not only modified the original 
question but also created a new question . . . .”). 
 53 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 423, para. 49; G.A. Res. 63/3, supra note 5. 
 54 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425, para. 54. 
 55 Id. at 424, para. 52. 
 56 Id. at 424–25, para. 53. 
 57 Id. 
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This decision prompted fierce opposition from Kosovo Opinion 
dissenters.58  Vice-President Judge Peter Tomka called this exercise an 
adjustment of the question, and found that there was no need for it.59  
Furthermore, examining the legislative history of Resolution 63/3, he found 
that most major parties accepted that the Provisional Institutions promulgated 
the UDI.60  Judge Mohamed Bennouna wrote that the ICJ “amended the 
question posed in a manner contrary to its object and purpose” and that such 
an exercise “would seriously prejudice the sense of judicial security” of the 
ICJ.61  Judge Abdul Koroma also wrote “[never] before has [the ICJ] 
reformulated a question to such an extent that a completely new question 
results, one clearly distinct from the original question posed and which, 
indeed, goes against the intent of the body asking it.”62  According to these 
judges, the ICJ answered the question that it wanted to answer, rather than 
the actual question set forth by the General Assembly.63 
This is not the only opinion in which the ICJ has reformulated or adjusted 
the question posed to it.64  In 1961, the General Assembly resolution 
authorizing the ICJ to take up the Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of 
the United Nations (Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion), Resolution 1731 
(XVI), was the subject of a proposed but never adopted amendment by 
France.65  The amendment would have changed the language of the advisory 
opinion’s question.66  The ICJ finds, as a preliminary matter, that “[t]he 
rejection of the French amendment does not constitute a directive to the 
Court . . . if the court finds such consideration appropriate.  It is not to be 
assumed that the General Assembly would thus seek to fetter or hamper the 
Court in its discharge of judicial functions.”67  In the Kosovo Opinion, the 
ICJ cites the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion as justification for 
“decid[ing] for itself whether [the UDI] was promulgated by the Provisional 
                                                                                                                   
 58 See Giuseppe Bianco, And Nothing Else Matters: The ICJ’s Judicial Restraint in its 
Opinion on Kosovo’s Independence, 2 PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM, no. 2, at N–24, N–30 
nn.XIX–XX (2010), available at http://www.on-federalism.eu/attachments/073_download.pdf 
(describing the dissenting judges’ censure of the ICJ’s intent-based authorship investigation). 
 59 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 456, para. 10 (Tomka, J., declaration).  
 60 Id. at 458–59, paras. 16–18 (Tomka, J., declaration).  
 61 Id. at 507, paras. 34–35 (Bennouna, J., dissenting).  
 62 Id. at 467–68, para. 3 (Koroma, J., dissenting). 
 63 Id.  
 64 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 156–57 
(July 20) (explaining that the ICJ may consider any aspect of a question which it views 
appropriate). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 156. 
 67 Id. at 157. 
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Institutions of Self-Government or some other entity” despite the fact that 
this was not the question asked to it.68  
There is a question of whether this adjustment affected the outcome; if it 
did, it may complicate the use of advisory jurisdiction by bodies such as the 
General Assembly.69  The ICJ determines this question by first considering 
whether SCR 1244 and the Constitutional Framework are still an active part 
of international law.70  SCR 1244 declares that the resolution is in effect until 
“the Security Council decides otherwise,”71 and the Security Council, besides 
deciding to “remain actively seized of the matter,”72 had not acted by 
February 2008.73  Additionally, there is no inherent mechanism for 
termination of either SCR 1244 or the Constitutional Framework.74  
Those legal regimes, and the institutions that they empowered, cannot 
exceed the powers delegated to them.75  The Constitutional Framework, 
which governed the Provisional Institutions, delegates to the Special 
Representative the authority over “concluding agreements with states and 
international organizations[,] . . . overseeing the fulfilment of commitments 
in international agreements[,] . . . [and] external relations.”76  At least 
between 2002 and 2005, the Assembly of Kosovo, which is authorized to 
govern based on the Constitutional Framework, was not free to act as a 
sovereign body.77  Under the Constitutional Framework, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo has the power to annul 
measures of the Provisional Institutions and declare them null and void if 
they are incompatible with the Constitutional Framework.78  In his separate 
declaration, Vice-President Tomka illustrated two incidents in which the 
Special Representative annulled acts of the Assembly of Kosovo that were 
similar to the February 2008 UDI.79  
In February 2003, the Assembly of Kosovo drafted a declaration entitled 
“Declaration on Kosov[o] — A Sovereign and Independent State,” which 
                                                                                                                   
 68 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425, para. 54. 
 69 Mark Angehr, Comment, The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Jurisdiction and 
the Review of Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 
1021 (2009) (arguing that “a revitalized advisory jurisdiction could potentially reduce the 
frequency of advisory opinion requests”). 
 70 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 442, para. 93. 
 71 SCR 1244, supra note 10, para. 19. 
 72 See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 73 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 441, para. 91. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 447, para. 108. 
 76 Id. at 446, para. 106 (quoting Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, ch. 8.1). 
 77 Id. at 447, para. 108. 
 78 Id.; id. at 464–65, para. 32 (Tomka, J., declaration). 
 79 Id. at 464–65, para. 32 (Tomka, J., declaration). 
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contained language suggesting that it was a declaration of independence.80  
The UN administration informed the Assembly that the declaration was 
“beyond the scope of its competencies.”81  Another attempted declaration by 
the Assembly in November 2005 was again pre-empted by the Special 
Representative, who informed the Assembly that such a declaration “would 
be in contravention to the UN Security Council resolution [1244] . . . and it 
therefore will not be with any legal effect.”82  
However, the ICJ notes that it is “of some significance” that the Special 
Representative did not undertake similar action when faced with the 
February 2008 UDI.83  The ICJ concludes that, based on prior practice of 
annulling such declarations, the Special Representative has a legal “duty to 
take action with regard to acts of the Assembly of Kosovo which he 
considered to be ultra vires.”84  Therefore, the silence of the Special 
Representative suggests that it was not a Provisional Institution that 
instituted the UDI, but an entity outside of that legal framework.85  
Despite this implicit confirmation, the ICJ looks beyond the immediate 
responsibilities and powers delegated to the individual branches of the 
Provisional Institutions when it examines the question of who was the author 
of the UDI.  It includes the “larger context.”86  SCR 1244 and the 
Constitutional Framework contemplate “that the final status of Kosovo 
would flow from, and be developed within, the framework set up by [SCR 
1244].”87  However, “[t]he declaration of independence reflects the 
awareness of its authors that the final status negotiations had failed and that a 
critical moment for the future of Kosovo had been reached.”88  Therefore, the 
authors of the UDI “set out to adopt a measure the significance and effects of 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Assembly of Kosova, Declaration on Kosova – A Sovereign and Independent State (Feb. 
3, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15038.pdf (scroll down to page 6 
of the document).  
 81 Letter from Charles H. Brayshaw, Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Sec’y-
Gen., to Nexhat Daci, President of the Assembly of Kos. (Feb. 7, 2003), available at http:// 
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15038.pdf (scroll down to page 9 of the document). 
 82 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 464–65, para. 32 (Tomka, J., declaration) (quoting U.N. 
Interim Mission in Kosovo, Press Briefing Notes, Nov. 16, 2005, at 4–5). 
 83 Id. at 447, para. 108 (main opinion). 
 84 Id. Ultra vires, Latin for “beyond the powers (of),” means beyond the scope of power 
allowed or granted by a corporate charter or law.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1662 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 85 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 447, para. 108; see also Robert Muharremi, A Note on 
the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, 11 GERMAN L.J. 867, 871 (2010) (finding that the 
silence was a positive expression of the Special Representative’s understanding that the 
declaration was an act not attributable to the Provisional Institutions). 
 86 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 445, para. 104. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 445–46, para. 105. 
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which would lie outside [the legal order created for the interim phase].”89  
Further, the ICJ, when it was looking to identify the authors of the UDI, did 
not look to who actually signed the document, which were the 109 members 
of the Assembly of Kosovo, the President of Kosovo, and the Prime Minister 
of Kosovo.90   
Rather, the ICJ looked to the circumstances surrounding the UDI, and it 
inquired into the intent of the UDI.  Was the UDI designed to work within 
the existing lex specialis91 that governed the territory covered by the UDI, or 
was it intended to work outside of it?  “If the ICJ had come to the conclusion 
that it was the [Provisional Institutions] which had declared independence, it 
would have been impossible to come to a conclusion other than that the 
[Provisional Institutions] had violated its competences under the 
Constitutional Framework . . . .”92  Therefore, the ICJ concluded that the 
February 2008 UDI was intended to work outside of the international legal 
regime that governed Kosovo,93 and that regime did not preempt the UDI 
from being issued. 
C.  The Holding 
There are two holdings of the Kosovo Opinion, addressing two different 
forms of international law: general and lex specialis.  The holding addressing 
general international law is “that general international law contains no 
applicable prohibition of declarations of independence.”94  This holding 
cannot be read as a determination that the declaration was legal.95   
The second holding is broken into two sections.  First, the holding 
investigates who authored the UDI and concludes that the authors were not 
the Assembly of Kosovo acting as a Provisional Institution.96  Second, as the 
authors were not governed by the lex specialis of SCR 1244 and the 
Constitutional Framework, the authors were in “accordance with 
international law.”97   
                                                                                                                   
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 435, para. 76. 
 91 Lex specialis, from Latin, from the phrase lex specialis derogat legi generali, means that 
a specific law overrides a general law, and the shorthand of the phrase refers to specific 
governing law that overrules general principles.  Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of 
Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 5 n.16 (2010). 
 92 Muharremi, supra note 85, at 872. 
 93 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 452, para. 121. 
 94 Id. at 438–39, para. 84. 
 95 Cirkovic, supra note 52, at 900. 
 96 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, 444–48, paras. 102–109. 
 97 Id. at 448–52, paras. 110–119. 
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The ICJ recognizes three broad fields of general international law under 
which a prohibition or a permission for unilateral declarations of 
independence may be found: historical state practice, the principle of 
territorial integrity, and the right to self-determination.  The investigation 
into the first field did not lend itself to an answer; nineteenth and twentieth 
century state practice did not demonstrate a prohibition on declarations of 
independence.98  The ICJ acknowledges that historically, declarations of 
independence could result in a new state, but that on many occasions a new 
state did not develop in spite of the declaration.99  Despite this complex 
history, the ICJ notes that state “practice during this period points clearly to 
the conclusion that international law contained no prohibition of declarations 
of independence.”100 
The ICJ does not end the historical argument with a simple statement of 
customary law.  Instead the ICJ recognizes that “the international law of self-
determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence 
for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation.”101 
The principle of territorial integrity might be contrary to a permissive 
ruling on declarations of independence.102  The UN Charter, as well as 
several General Assembly resolutions and conferences, “enumerated various 
obligations incumbent upon States to refrain from violating the territorial 
integrity of other sovereign States.”103  The ICJ considers the principle of 
territorial integrity an important part of the legal order.104  Its importance, 
however, is irrelevant to the ICJ’s consideration of the Kosovo case: the 
principle of territorial integrity only applies to state action vis-à-vis other 
states, and therefore is inapplicable in this case.105 
                                                                                                                   
 98 Id. at 436, para. 79. 
 99 Id.  
 100 Id.; see also Daniel Fierstein, Note, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An Incident 
Analysis of Legality, Policy and Future Implications, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 417, 431 (2008) 
(“State practice suggests that there is very little, if any, support for unilateral declarations of 
independence like that of Kosovo, where the government of a particular State demonstrates 
opposition to secession.”). 
 101 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 436, para. 79. 
 102 Id. at 437–38, para. 81; see, e.g., id. paras. 20–27 (written statement of Spain), available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15644.pdf (arguing that UN Conventions and state 
practice confirm that respect for territorial integrity is controlling over “an alleged right to 
self-determination exercised via a unilateral act”).  
 103 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 437, para. 80; see, e.g., Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8018, 
at 123 (Oct. 24, 1970); Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
art. 1, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). 
 104 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 437, para. 80. 
 105 Id. (“[T]he scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of 
relations between States.”). 
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The ICJ does not explicitly consider whether the right to self-
determination or remedial secession informs the question presented in the 
Kosovo Opinion.106  Because, as it argues, a unilateral declaration of 
independence may not “be in violation of international law without 
necessarily constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it,” the ICJ finds 
that there is no need to consider whether a right does exist.107  This argument 
is based on the Lotus presumption that whatever international law does not 
prohibit is e contrario allowed.108  The ICJ thus recognizes that unilateral 
declarations of independence are not per se illegal.  
III.  THE CASE FOR A REMEDIAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
Despite the fact that the ICJ explicitly denies that it made any ruling on 
“remedial secession,”109 the process used by the ICJ to the identity of the 
authors of the UDI contained elements of remedial secession doctrine.  The 
February 2008 UDI and the ICJ’s UDI authorship argument are similar to a 
Supreme Court of Canada ruling in a similar case over the secession of 
Quebec.110  The ICJ refuses this comparison; unlike the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the ICJ claims it was not asked “to take a position on whether 
international law conferred a positive entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to 
declare its independence.”111  Because the General Assembly did not pose 
the question of remedial secession, the ICJ attempted to avoid answering it. 
However, in the arguments it made supporting its holdings, the ICJ 
unquestionably relied on concepts drawn from the doctrine of remedial 
secession.112  The following is not only a survey of the law of remedial 
secession as it applies to Kosovo; it is also the outline for an argument that 
the Kosovo case established a precedent for remedial acts of self-
determination, including the remedial declaration of independence.   
                                                                                                                   
 106 Id. at 438, para. 83. 
 107 Id. at 425–26, para. 56. 
 108 S.S. Lotus (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, para. 46 (Sept. 7); see also 
Thomas Burri, The Kosovo Opinion and Secession: The Sounds of Silence and Missing Links, 
11 GERMAN L.J. 881, 883 (2010) (finding that the Lotus presumption is not appropriate in 
modern international law, as the lacunae are often supplanted by “soft rules”). 
 109 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425–26, 438, paras. 56, 82–83. 
 110 See Jure Vidmar, International Legal Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of 
Independence, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 779, 814–18 (2009) (discussing the remedial 
secessionist framework developed by the Canadian Supreme Court as applicable to the 
Kosovar declaration of independence). 
 111 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425–26, para. 56. 
 112 For an explicit argument that the ICJ should have granted Kosovo the right to remedial 
secession based on humanist grounds, see id. at 584, para. 156 (Trindade, J., separate 
opinion). 
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A.  Remedial Secession in International Law 
Compare this preliminary remedial declaration of independence with the 
existing body of law that recognizes a positive right to remedial secession.113  
Remedial secession is the exercise of the right to self-determination in 
“case[s] in which intra-State groups with a particular identity (minorities, 
indigenous peoples) are victims of serious breaches of their fundamental 
civil and human rights.”114  Remedial secession is a function of the 
paradoxical discouragement and encouragement of secession in the UN 
Declaration on Friendly Relations.115  The Declaration on Friendly Relations 
reaffirms that, as a principle of international law, “States shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State.”116  This is contrasted 
against, in the same declaration, “[t]he principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.”117  The impossibility of reconciling the principle 
of territoriality with the right to self-determination evolved into the doctrine 
of remedial secession. 
Commentators are split as to when the right to remedial secession is 
activated.  Some commentators argue that there are two conditions to 
activation: the first, a violation of the group’s right to self-determination, and 
the second, the commission of gross violations of human rights to its 
detriment.118  Other commentators argue that the existence of either 
condition activates the right to remedial secession.119  In either case, under 
the circumstances in Kosovo, the classical right to self-determination 
applies.120 
These issues are not new to international courts.  The League of Nations, 
the predecessor to the UN and the ICJ, dealt with the issue of remedial self-
determination in the Aaland Islands Case.121  In 1809, Sweden ceded Finland 
and an archipelago in the Baltic Sea known as the Aaland Islands to 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Vidmar, supra note 110, at 814–18. 
 114 Antonello Tancredi, A Normative ‘Due Process’ in the Creation of States Through 
Secession, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 171, 176 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 
2006). 
 115 KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 76–77 
(2002) (noting that the right to self-determination cannot violate the principle of territorial 
integrity outlined in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 103). 
 116 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 103, pmbl. 
 117 Id.; Tancredi calls this clause the “safeguard clause.”  Tancredi, supra note 114, at 178. 
 118 Tancredi, supra note 114, at 177. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id.  
 121 Decision of the Council of the League of Nations on the Åland Islands Including 
Sweden’s Protest (Sept. 1921) [hereinafter Aaland Islands Case], available at http://www.ku 
lturstiftelsen.ax/traktater/eng_fr/1921a_en.htm. 
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Russia.122  After the Bolshevik Revolution, Finland declared independence, 
but the islands declared that they would be Swedish.123  Finland invaded the 
islands to quell the uprising, and the League of Nations became involved.124  
The second Commission of Rapporteurs on that case indicated while there 
was not a general right to secede, the “separation of a minority from the State 
of which it forms part and its incorporation into another State may only be 
considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State 
lacks either the will or the power to apply just and effective guarantees.”125  
In the League of Nations’ resolution of the matter, it made certain 
“guarantees” to the islanders against Finland’s full sovereignty, including an 
“autonomy law” and the preservation of the islanders’ native tongue, 
Swedish.126  The predecessor of the UN thus partially abrogated the principle 
of territoriality in favor of self-determination. 
B.  Remedial Secession under Reference re Secession of Quebec 
The ICJ recognized, in the Kosovo Opinion, that the Canadian Supreme 
Court had addressed the issue of remedial self-determination in an advisory 
opinion.127  In Reference re Secession of Quebec (Reference re Secession), 
the Canadian Supreme Court responded to three questions submitted to it.128  
The most important was the second question, the language of which the ICJ 
quoted verbatim in the Kosovo Opinion,  
Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature, 
or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of 
Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a 
right to self-determination under international law that would 
give the National Assembly, legislature or government of 
Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from 
Canada unilaterally?129 
Following this question, the Canadian Supreme Court declared that there 
is no legal right for component territories of a state to secede unilaterally 
                                                                                                                   
 122 Oliver Diggelmann, The Aaland Case and the Sociological Approach to International 
Law, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 135, 136–37 (2007). 
 123 Id. at 136. 
 124 Id. at 137. 
 125 Report Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Comm’n of Rapporteurs, 
League of Nations Doc. B7.21/68/106, paras. 21, 28 (1921). 
 126 Aaland Islands Case, supra note 121. 
 127 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425–26, paras. 55–56. 
 128 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
 129 Id. para. 2; Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425, para. 55. 
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from their parent.130  Furthermore, where “unilateral secession would be 
incompatible with the domestic Constitution, international law is likely to 
accept that conclusion subject to the right of peoples to self-
determination.”131  This matches the Aaland Islands Case’s position that the 
right to self-determination could trump territorial cohesion.132 
The Canadian Supreme Court splits self-determination into two 
cognizable forms: internal and external.133  Internal self-determination is 
defined as: “a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural 
development within the framework of an existing state.”134  The definition of 
external self-determination, which arises “in only the most extreme of cases 
and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances,” was borrowed from 
the Declaration on Friendly Relations as “a sovereign and independent 
State . . . [with] the free association or integration with an independent 
State.”135  
Further, the Canadian Supreme Court recognizes three situations in which 
a cognizable right to self-determination, either internal or external, develops: 
“colonial peoples,” peoples “subject to alien subjugation, domination, or 
exploitation,” and peoples who claim a right to remedial secession.136  The 
right to remedial secession occurs “when a people is blocked from the 
meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally.”137  This 
might occur, for example, if external and imposed frameworks (e.g., SCR 
1244) prevent a conclusion mandated by international law (e.g., Kosovo’s de 
facto independence).  
Therefore, the Kosovo case had the hallmarks of an opportunity for the 
ICJ to opine on and define remedial secession,138 but the ICJ expressly 
denies that it needed to decide on whether such a right existed “outside the 
context of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation.”139  A turn to classical secessionist 
analysis, as the ICJ suggests, does not leave the ICJ with any clearer legal 
territory. 
                                                                                                                   
 130 Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. para. 111. 
 131 Id. para. 112. 
 132 Diggelmann, supra note 122, at 137. 
 133 Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. para. 126. 
 134 Id.  
 135 Id. (quoting Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 103, at 124). 
 136 Id. paras. 131–134. 
 137 Id. para. 134. 
 138 Mindia Vashakmadze & Matthias Lippold, “Nothing But a Road Towards Secession”? – 
The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Accordance with International Law 
of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 
619, 636 (2010). 
 139 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 425–26, 438, paras. 55–56, 82–83. 
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C.  Problems of Classical Secession Law 
In all likelihood, Kosovo does not have a right to secede in classical 
international law for two reasons: one, the Kosovars are not a traditional 
“peoples” whose rights to external self-determination are protected by 
international law,140 and two, Kosovo does not possess the classical 
requirements for statehood.141 
The concept of a “people” is poorly defined in international law, allowing 
disparate views to coexist and further complicate the definition.142  The term 
“people” traditionally describes particular and clearly defined groups: 
“citizens of a nation-state, the inhabitants in a specific territory being 
decolonized by a foreign power, or an ethnic group.”143  The definition of 
who is a “people” is important because the UN Charter imparts a right to 
self-determination to “peoples,”144 and subsequent UN conventions support 
the conclusion that a right to self-determination belong to certain 
“peoples.”145 
Whether or not a certain collectivity is a “people” is a qualitative 
question, not a quantitative one.146  While the question has been written on 
extensively, a definitive answer to whether the Kosovars are a “people” is 
not forthcoming.147  The vagueness of international law provides extensive 
rights to peoples, but not to similar collectivities that are not entitled to the 
title.148  Because the Kosovars have not definitively asserted the right to be 
                                                                                                                   
 140 See generally U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2, art. 55; G.A. Res. 1514(XV), U.N. Doc. 
A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 141 See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 3802 
L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. 
 142 Compare Fierstein, supra note 100, at 433 (finding that, despite treaty law and judicial 
opinion support for defining “peoples” as an ethnic minority within a particular territory, state 
practice supports defining “peoples” as an entire nation), with K. William Watson, When In 
the Course of Human Events: Kosovo’s Independence and the Law of Secession, 17 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 267, 282 (2008) (finding that defining Albanian Kosovars as a “people” is 
“not a difficult task,” and that defining “peoples” is either a self-evident question or in 
contrast with the definition of “[a] ‘minority’ ”).  
 143 Christopher J. Borgen, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, 
Secession and Recognition, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 29. 2008), http://www.asil.org/insights0802 
29.cfm. 
 144 U.N. Charter, supra note 140, art. 1, para. 2, art. 55. 
 145 E.g., Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 103, at 122; ICCPR, supra note 140; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 146 David Makinson, Rights of Peoples: A Logician’s Point of View, in THE RIGHTS OF 
PEOPLES 69, 73 (James Crawford ed., 1988). 
 147 Zejnullah Gruda, Some Key Principles for a Lasting Solution of the Status of Kosova: Uti 
Possidetis, the Ethnic Principle, and Self-Determination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 353, 367 (2005). 
 148 ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 1. 
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considered a people and the default status of an undefined collectivity is not 
a people, the Kosovar community is not a “people” under international law. 
In order to determine whether Kosovo has reached or achieved full 
statehood, it must first be established that the international criteria for 
statehood must be met.149  In the 1993 Montevideo Convention, four criteria 
were outlined to qualify whether an entity can achieve statehood: a defined 
territory, a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter 
into international relations.150  Some scholars assert that Kosovo meets three 
out of four of the criteria of the Montevideo Convention, excluding 
“effective government over its territory,”151 but alternatively, others conclude 
that it meets all of the traditional Montevideo criteria.152  However, the 
Constitutional Framework explicitly reserves the capacity to enter into 
international relations to the Special Representative, not to any of the 
Provisional Institutions.153  Since the Constitutional Framework is active 
international law, Kosovo must not meet at least the ‘capacity to enter into 
international relations’ prong of the Montevideo Convention and accordingly 
does not possess all of the traditional criteria for statehood.154  Therefore, 
classical secession law does not apply to Kosovo. 
D.  The Remedial Declaration of Independence 
No matter what its intent, the ICJ frames the circumstances surrounding 
the February 2008 UDI in the doctrine of remedial secession.  While the ICJ 
cannot find Kosovo independent or certify Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence,155 this case stands as precedent to undertake such action.  The 
remedial declaration of independence, drawn from the Kosovo case, is not 
the first act of a sovereign state, or even an act in a continuum of action with 
its final goal being sovereignty.156  If the Kosovo Opinion stands for 
anything, it is that international law is silent on declarations of 
independence.157  Furthermore, international law cannot precisely define 
                                                                                                                   
 149 Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans,” Secession, and 
the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 137, 147 (2010). 
 150 Montevideo Convention, supra note 141, art. 1. 
 151 Watson, supra note 142, at 290. 
 152 Fierstein, supra note 100, at 440 (“Kosovo seems to objectively satisfy the traditional 
criteria.”). 
 153 Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, ch. 8. 
 154 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 442, para. 93.  
 155 See infra Part IV (the consent-driven nature of international law prevents a self-conscious 
court from exerting power not granted to it). 
 156 Richard Caplan, The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo (U.S. Inst. of Peace, Peace Brief 
No. 55, Sept. 17, 2010). 
 157 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 438–39, para. 84. 
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when and how non-State action precipitates into sovereign State action.158  
However, the Kosovo case clarifies an important point: when an actor who 
has been partially granted sovereignty by a “parent” sovereign entity is 
frustrated in its pursuit of internal self-determination by external 
circumstances, the actor may issue a declaration of independence purporting 
to establish external self-determination in violation of applicable lex specialis 
if the “parent” does not positively exclude such action.159 
1. The Partially Sovereign Actor, the “Parent,” and the Lex Specialis 
In Kosovo from 1999 until 2010, political and legal authority was 
undoubtedly held by the UNMIK, authorized by SCR 1244.160  This political 
and legal authority derived from clause 11(e) of SCR 1244, in which “the 
international civil presence” would be responsible for “[f]acilitating a 
political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.”161  This 
political process is enshrined in the Constitutional Framework, adopted in 
2001, which also reserves significant powers in the Special 
Representative.162  Further, the Special Representative is obligated to 
“[undertake] the necessary measures to facilitate the transfer of powers and 
responsibilities to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government.”163  
Having granted itself the exclusive right to hold political and legal authority 
over Kosovo, the UN became the “dominant government administrator” of 
Kosovo.164 
Furthermore, it is exceedingly unclear who is sovereign over Kosovar 
territory.  An annex to SCR 1244 contemplates that the future status process 
of Kosovo would end with an autonomous Kosovo within a sovereign State 
of Serbia.165  However, the Assembly of Kosovo resolved that the political 
process would end with an independent and sovereign Kosovo.166 
                                                                                                                   
 158 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 261–62 (2d ed. 
2006) (noting that “it is not easy to formulate any satisfactory test for determining the 
statehood of the seceding entity before its complete success”). 
 159 For a discussion on a different paradigm of self-determination and secession, which 
includes factors such as human rights violations, attempted negotiated settlements, the will of 
the supermajority, and economic and international political viability, and how it applies to 
Kosovo, see Robert Trisotto, Seceding in the Twenty-First Century: A Paradigm for the Ages, 
35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 419 (2010). 
 160 SCR 1244, supra note 10. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, ch. 8. 
 163 Id. ch. 14.2.  
 164 Fierstein, supra note 100, at 438. 
 165 SCR 1244, supra note 10, Annex II; see also Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, 
Letter dated Jan. 3, 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Serbia to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2007/2, U.N. Doc. A/61/688 (Jan. 5, 
2007) (“[SCR 1244] explicitly reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
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Describing with any specificity the relationship between the people and 
territory of Kosovo and the UN governing them is incredibly complex, but 
crucial to understanding the Kosovo Opinion’s holding.  For example, this is 
not a protectorate relationship because Kosovo never agreed to be bound by 
the Security Council and it was never entitled to do so under international 
law.167  The process of slowly transferring authority from the Special 
Representative to the partially sovereign Assembly of Kosovo would 
properly be classified as devolution.168  There is a difficulty “reconciling 
formal dependence with substantial practical autonomy” in devolution 
relationships, but the partial sovereignty remains subordinated until “all 
substantial legal links . . . are severed.”169  
The requirement that a state must be completely separate from its parent 
before achieving sovereignty is the “unitary State theory,”170 and was 
endorsed by the ICJ in its predecessor form, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), in the Lighthouses in Crete and Samos Case.171  
The question presented to the PCIJ was whether the Ottoman Empire could 
enter into a concession agreement with a French company with regard to 
lighthouses situated on Crete and Samos, two islands that were formally part 
of the Ottoman Empire but were now functionally autonomous.172  The PCIJ 
found that only by a treaty of cession could Crete claim sovereignty:  
Notwithstanding its autonomy, Crete had not ceased to be a 
part of the Ottoman Empire.  Even though the Sultan had been 
obliged to accept important restrictions on the exercise of his 
rights to sovereignty in Crete, that sovereignty had not ceased 
to belong to him, however it might be qualified from a 
juridicial point of view.173 
                                                                                                                   
Republic of Serbia, stipulating that the province of Kosovo . . . should be ensured substantial 
autonomy within the State of Serbia.”). 
 166 Assembly of Kosovo, Resolution on Riconfirmation of Political Will of Kosova People 
for Kosova an Indipendent and Sovreign State (Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://www.asse 
mbly-kosova.org/common/docs/Resolution.%20english,%20version.17.11.05.pdf. 
 167 CRAWFORD, supra note 158, at 287. 
 168 Id. at 349. 
 169 Id. at 349–51. 
 170 Id. at 351. 
 171 Lighthouses in Crete and Samos (Fr. v. Greece), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 62 (Oct. 8) 
[hereinafter Lighthouses]. 
 172 Id. para. 3; CRAWFORD, supra note 158, at 354. 
 173 Lighthouses, supra note 171, para. 38. 
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A separate opinion implied that the concession agreement was an 
interventionist act done to protect residual imperial interests,174 which were 
the lighthouses themselves.175 
Applying the unitary state theory to Kosovo immediately prior to 
February 2008, the only conclusion that one can draw is that strong political 
links remained between the Provisional Institutions and the Special 
Representative.  They shared political power.176  SCR 1244 is still in effect 
and the Special Representative still holds “considerable supervisory 
powers.”177  Therefore, sovereign power cannot devolve to the Assembly of 
Kosovo. 
If the relationship is not one of devolution, then some alternative 
explanation must exist for the Special Representative to declare the February 
2003 and November 2005 acts of the Assembly of Kosovo illegal178 and the 
ICJ to find that the February 2008 act was not illegal.  Without other sources 
of law, the alternative explanation must be found in the lex specialis that 
governs the relationship between the two parties: SCR 1244 and the 
Constitutional Framework.   
The ICJ makes three explicit statements about SCR 1244 and the 
framework it creates.  First, it was a crisis response and “must be understood 
as an exceptional measure . . . aimed at addressing the crisis.”179  Second, 
SCR 1244 “was designed for humanitarian purposes; to provide a means for 
the stabilization of Kosovo and for the re-establishment of a basic public 
order.”180  Third, it “clearly establishe[d] an interim regime; it cannot be 
understood as putting in place a permanent institutional framework.”181  
Therefore, SCR 1244, the Constitutional Framework, and the powers of the 
Special Representative were exceptional, temporary, and humanitarian in 
purpose.  But since these powers were temporary, there was a legal 
obligation on all parties to constantly seek an end to the use of those 
powers.182  At what point is there a danger of these powers becoming 
                                                                                                                   
 174 Id. para. 82 (Hurst, J., separate opinion). 
 175 CRAWFORD, supra note 158, at 355–56. 
 176 The Constitutional Framework gave the Special Representative judicial and executive 
powers over Provisional Institutions.  See Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, ch. 8.1. 
 177 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 6, at 440–42, paras. 90–93. 
 178 Id. at 464–65, para. 32 (Tomka, declaration). 
 179 Id. at 443, para. 97 (main opinion). 
 180 Id. at 443–44, para. 98. 
 181 Id. at 444, para. 99. 
 182 See Constitutional Framework, supra note 10, pmbl. (“[R]esponsibilities will be 
transferred to Provisional Institutions . . . with a view to facilitating the determination of 
Kosovo’s future status . . . .”).  But see U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.4011 (June 10, 1999) (The United States representative said, in the debate over SCR 
1244, that “[t]his resolution provides for the [UNMIK] to remain in place until the Security 
Council affirmatively decides that conditions exist for their completion”). 
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permanent, so that a declaration of independence would be timely?  The ICJ 
answers this question by identifying several key events that exemplified 
frustrating external circumstances.183 
2. The Frustrating External Circumstances 
Because the UNMIK and the Special Representative could not satisfy 
their legal obligations under the governing lex specialis, the ICJ implicitly 
recognized that extraordinary action was appropriate.184  The ICJ believes 
that the starting date of these new obligations occurred on October 24, 2005, 
when the Security Council announced that it supported the commencement 
of “the final status process,” which is supported by the categorization of this 
statement as the chronologically first “relevant” event to the UDI.185  
Responding to the Security Council’s announcement, the Secretary-
General appointed a Special Envoy to govern the negotiations for the final 
status process, which the Security Council approved.186  However, after 
multiple rounds of negotiations, the Envoy concluded in its March 2007 
letter that no “mutually agreeable outcome” was available, and explicitly 
endorsed a Kosovar UDI.187  This letter came after the February 2003 and 
November 2005 declarations of independence by the Assembly of Kosovo, 
which the Special Representative declared illegal, but before the February 
2008 declaration, which the Special Representative did not.  
Despite this inconsistency, the Security Council, although actively seized 
of the matter, did not act on the issue188 as it “was not able to reach a 
decision regarding the final status of Kosovo.”  A draft resolution, circulated 
but not adopted by the Security Council, would have terminated the 
international civil presence in Kosovo after 120 days from the date the 
resolution was adopted.189  A “Troika” of the EU, Russia, and the United 
States attempted to negotiate a final status process, but despite the fact that 
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talks went on for 120 days at the highest levels of Serbian and Kosovar 
governments, “the parties were unable to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s 
status.”190  “[M]ost, if not all, realistic options other than separation had 
failed.”191  
The inability of the international community and internationally 
designated actors such as the Special Envoy to agree on a final status process 
for Kosovo for three years (from March 2005 to February 2008) may be the 
type of impediment Kosovo’s right to internal self-determination that would 
permit action under the third prong of the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
secession analysis.192  International negotiations, such as the one presented 
here,193 are hampered because “[t]here is no agreement over common basic 
principle, above all self-determination and its practical application.”194  Even 
if a definitive and legally binding statement on the principle of self-
determination existed, which could have but did not occur in the Kosovo 
Case,195 remedial secession would be available “only in the most dire 
situations.”196 
Even though the Security Council remained seized of the Kosovo matter 
and that “[t]he final decision on the status of Kosovo should be endorsed by 
the Security Council,”197 the ICJ concludes that “the Security Council did not 
reserve for itself the final determination of the situation in Kosovo.”198  In his 
separate declaration, Vice-President Tomka complained that “the [majority’s 
opinion] provides no explanation why acts which were considered as going 
beyond the competencies of the Provisional Institutions in the period 2002–
2005, would no longer have any such character in 2008.”199  The explanation 
is likely the Special Envoy’s March 2007 letter and proposal, the failure of 
the Security Council to adopt either the Special Envoy’s proposal or an 
alternative, and the Troika’s failure to find a special settlement.  These 
events, which only demonstrate the frustration of the UN mandate under 
international law to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future 
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status, were sufficient to give a remedial process toward external self-
determination legitimacy under international law. 
3. The Silent Agreement 
Under this theory, the “parent” state constructs an interim regime that 
should naturally conclude in self-determination of the actor, but fails due to 
external, unforeseen circumstances. Without further action or inaction where 
action is demanded from the “parent,” nothing happens.  The latter presents 
in the Kosovo Opinion when the ICJ classifies the silence of the Special 
Representative as having “some significance.”  The majority concludes that 
the silence suggested “that [the Special Representative] did not consider that 
the declaration was an act of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
designed to take effect within the legal order for the supervision of which he 
was responsible.”200  Vice-President Tomka, in his separate declaration, 
believes that this silence was part of a conspiracy to implement the Special 
Envoy’s March 2007 proposal, and had no legal significance.201 
The majority, however, concludes that where prior practice has 
established that the Special Representative may declare acts of other 
institutions ultra vires, the Special Representative is thereafter under a legal 
obligation to do so.202  Furthermore, because the ICJ takes the silence as 
evidence that the act was not ultra vires, the ICJ also concludes as a corollary 
that the Special Representative’s pronouncements on the matter are legally 
significant.203  This is in contrast to the UNMIK Reports to the Secretary-
General, which the ICJ accords no legal weight.204 
Special Representatives therefore play an important discretionary role.  
Whereas the Constitutional Framework might explicitly give the Special 
Representative the power of external self-determination over a territory, the 
Special Representative may withhold or devolve that power to local 
authorities where he or she deems it is appropriate.205  The Special 
Representatives hold veto power over declarations of independence.  As a 
matter of policy, the ICJ is permitting a much more localized (as opposed to 
a more removed body such as the Security Council) determination of 
whether explicit acts of external self-determination are appropriate at a given 
time or place.   
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IV.  THE ICJ’S PRACTICAL LIMITS 
In Judge Simma’s declaration, attached to the Kosovo Opinion, he wrote 
that the ICJ was holding onto old world conceptions and not moving forward 
with international law at the pace that he would like.206  For example, he 
specifically criticized the ICJ’s desire to hold onto the Lotus principle.207  
Unfortunately for Judge Simma, the ICJ likely had no choice in the matter.  
Not only as a matter of the complexity of crafting a ruling of law on a subject 
dominated by political, not legal concerns, but as a matter of the institutional 
structure of international tribunals, the ICJ was likely prohibited from a more 
expansive ruling. 
A.  Hersch Lauterpacht’s Theory of Judicial Caution  
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht wrote an excellent criticism and analysis on 
international judicial reticence, and one that is fully applicable to the Kosovo 
case.  Lauterpacht received his doctorate in law from the University of 
Vienna, and wrote another dissertation for the London School of 
Economics.208  He wrote his key work in 1933, The Function of Law in the 
International Community.209  In 1954, he was elected a judge on the ICJ, and 
in 1957, he published a work entitled The Development of International Law 
by the International Court, where he articulated his theory of judicial 
caution.210 
Lauterpacht wrote that judicial caution—likely a central system of 
reasoning driving the majority’s holding in the Kosovo Opinion—results 
from “the fact that courts have to apply the law and that they have to apply 
the law in force.”211  International judges have a proscribed field in which 
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they must both find the applicable law and then utilize that law to resolve 
disputes, or, in the case of the Kosovo case, answer questions posed to them.  
While Lauterpacht did argue that judicial caution resulted from the principles 
of the international judiciary, judges were not “limited to the barest 
minimum which is required for the decision,” and could craft opinions with 
serious implications in international law.212   
However Lauterpacht made one point clear, which also must apply here: 
“It is not [the international courts’] . . . function deliberately to change the 
law so as to make it conform with their own views of justice and 
expediency.”213  Why?  Because “[i]f Governments are not prepared to 
entrust with legislative functions bodies composed of their authorised 
representatives, they will not be prepared to allow or tolerate the exercise of 
such activity by a tribunal enjoined by its Statute to apply the existing 
law.”214  If Serbia is not willing to entrust sovereign power to the Republic of 
Kosovo, then it would not abide by an ICJ opinion that did. 
This basis of judicial caution, then, has much less to do with the difficulty 
of finding an international law to apply to a certain dispute.  Lauterpacht 
argued that the international tribunal is self-aware of the possibility of a 
suicide by judgment.215  This reticence acknowledges that making an 
expansive ruling based on an international judiciary’s policies, rather than a 
state’s, is not a judicial feature but a political one.216  In short, the tribunal’s 
rulings, judgments, and findings will always have, as a source of law, the 
tribunal’s interest in self-preservation. 
However, when a state seeks not to be bound by the ICJ, it does not try to 
attack the ICJ’s existence.  In some cases, especially the Corfu Channel 
Case,217 the state that seeks not to be bound practices defiance.218  In the 
Corfu Channel Case, Albania boycotted a portion of the proceedings.219  
However, while there may be a greater political cost for boycotting ICJ 
proceedings than ever before, the ICJ is still mindful that it has little recourse 
without state participation.220 
As a result, judicial caution is expressed “in the disinclination to make 
pronouncements on questions not essential to an exhaustive examination of 
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the contentions of the parties, and, generally, in avoiding so far as possible a 
dogmatic manner in the statement of the law.”221  To illustrate this point, 
Lauterpacht proceeded to cite a number of cases in which the ICJ, when 
given an opportunity to rule aggressively on points of international law, 
declined to do so.222  Judge Simma’s complaint of an overly cautious tribunal 
is, therefore, not unusual.223  
This judicial reticence, to make clear statements of law, impeded the 
function of the ICJ as an organ that clarifies and explains the law.224  
However, by restating the law as it already exists, the exercise of this 
function is nearly legislative in character and may run afoul of the ICJ’s 
position as an organ that exists at the whim of state consent.  This extreme 
judicial restraint prompted Lauterpacht to note that “writers” filled what 
would have been the clarifying function of the ICJ.225  The Statute of the ICJ 
specifically permits the ICJ to use writers as a source of law.226  Therefore, 
the ICJ is willing to partially delegate what would be intrinsic functions to 
non-state and non-tribunal actors prior to accepting certain precepts as its 
own.  This would support the practice of delegating to the Special 
Representative a veto power over remedial declarations of independence. 
Lauterpacht then uses the Corfu Channel case227 to show that, while there 
were important, substantive issues of international law at play in the case that 
would have benefited from clarification or restatement, the ICJ refused to 
elucidate on them.228  In the Corfu Channel Case, “a great deal of the effort 
of the [ICJ] . . . was directed to the elucidation of disputed and complicated 
questions of fact.”229  Also, such a discussion, like an elucidation on remedial 
secession and declarations of independence, might have been considered 
obiter dictum230 and not directly applicable to the decision.231 
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Certain features of Lauterpacht’s arguments become clear. (1) The ICJ’s 
decisions are heavily influenced by its own awareness that a state’s sovereign 
power trumps its judicial ruling.  (2) Because the ICJ’s words are not binding 
between states as international law, ICJ opinions may only be ratified as law 
by state action.  (3) Since the ICJ requires state cooperation to conduct its 
affairs, it has an interest in saying as little as possible so as not to overreach.  
Therefore, when it is presented with an issue involving a novel issue of 
international law, unclear sovereignty over territory, and conflicting state 
action, it would be more important, not less, to issue a narrow opinion. 
B.  Recognition 
The modern understanding of international recognition of new states 
complicates Kosovar self-determination and secession, and the examination 
of this particular problem has been extensive.232  Because a new sovereign 
state may have to be recognized by pre-existing sovereign states prior to the 
full accession of a non-sovereign state to sovereignty, an explicit recognition 
of the Republic of Kosovo by the ICJ could not occur in the Kosovo case.  If 
such a requirement exists, then the ICJ could not have declared Kosovo a 
sovereign state or decided whether Kosovo was empowered with external 
self-determination. 
Recognition is crucial because, before they are accepted into the 
international community, new states must interact with other states in a 
bilateral relationship, which in turn cannot occur if states refuse to recognize 
the new state.233  Non-recognition in the international community can 
delegitimize a state that would otherwise fulfill the minimum legal 
requirements of a state.234  Lauterpacht wrote that non-recognition is the 
minimum resistance the international community can take to the illegal 
formation of a state and a “continuous challenge to a legal wrong.”235   
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There are two broad and recognized theories of recognition in 
international law.  The first, and most widely accepted, premise is known as 
the declaratory theory.236  The first major adoption of the declaratory theory 
was in the Tinoco Arbitration case, in which Chief Justice Taft, acting as 
arbitrator, wrote, “[W]hen recognition vel non of a government is by such 
nations determined by enquiry, not into its de facto sovereignty . . . but into 
its illegitimacy or irregularity of origin, their non-recognition loses 
something of evidential weight . . . .”237  Article 3 of the Montevideo 
Convention partially codified the theory: “The political existence of a state is 
independent of recognition by other states.”238  Recognition becomes a 
discretionary and political act that is non-binding and without legal 
significance in the purely objective determination of whether a political 
entity is a sovereign state.  Unsurprisingly, state practice complicates the 
theory: 
It is, however, difficult to maintain that an entity that has 
received recognition by none or a very few States, such as the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or South Africa’s 
Bantustan States . . . can claim to be a State, as it cannot 
demonstrate its capacity to enter into relations with other States 
and thus from a functional point of view cannot be described as 
a State.239 
Since the capacity to enter into relations with other states defines a state, 
other states’ cooperation in the formation of a new state is a necessary 
precondition to the new state’s full accession to sovereignty.240 
The other major theory of recognition is the constitutive theory, which 
sourced the accession of a political entity to a sovereign state solely in the 
recognition, either express or implied, of other sovereign states.241  The 
question of how a state becomes a state is irrelevant; the only relevant 
question is whether that state is recognized.242  Lauterpacht was a proponent 
of the constitutive theory.243 
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Lauterpacht advocated for a hybrid between the declaratory and 
constitutive theories.244  He recognized, substantively, that state recognition 
and accession to statehood were based on external recognition.245  A state 
could not become a state just because it reached a certain point in its 
development.  However, this did not mean that states were free to grant or 
withhold recognition on a purely subjective basis.246  In extreme cases of 
denial of reality, Lauterpacht attached a duty to recognize.247  Eventually, he 
saw a supra-national organ taking over the responsibility for recognizing 
states, but until then the existing states took the role.248  In order for a 
complete legal system to exist, there must be some entity that conclusively 
determine the subjects of the system.249 
Lauterpacht’s theories on recognition have not held up over time.  First, 
scholars acknowledge that individual states cannot assume the same 
responsibilities or act with the same form of definitiveness that an 
international tribunal would.250  “If individual States were free to determine 
the legal status or consequences of particular situations and to do so 
definitively, international law would be reduced to a form of imperfect 
communications, a system for registering the asset or dissent of individual 
States without any prospect of resolution.”251  Secondly, if the constitutive 
theory was correct, then there could be no such thing as an illegal 
recognition, but there are some acts of recognition that are considered rightly 
invalid.252  Finally, the constitutive theory is relativistic.253  If the only 
condition of sovereignty for a state was recognition, then there would be no 
such thing as a state’s “absolute existence,” for a “state exists legally only in 
its relations to other states.”254 
UN membership has been identified as a criterion for transition to 
independent statehood.255  A collective organization’s recognition would 
have “substantial probative value” in determining statehood, and it is 
possible that “the collective acknowledgement of status that might have been 
effected by a system of organized collective recognition is achieved by 
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admission to the United Nations.”256  Since UN membership “requires 
substantial support from existing Member States, admission is [therefore] 
strong evidence of the necessary status.”257  However, ICJ law, facts, and 
state practice make Kosovo recognition and admission irresolvable. 
The ICJ did not recognize the Republic of Kosovo during the proceedings 
prior to the Kosovo Opinion.  Instead, it invited the authors of the UDI—as 
authors and not as the Republic of Kosovo—to join the Member States in 
submitting written arguments.258  The Republic of Kosovo’s website lists 
eighty-six nations as recognizing Kosovo, including the United States, 
United Kingdom, and France.259  However, Russia is “utterly opposed” to 
Kosovar statehood.260  Since UN membership cannot occur without the 
approval or abstention of every permanent member of the Security 
Council,261 and Russia is one,262 it is unlikely that the UN will recognize and 
admit Kosovo.  
ICJ law and state practice regarding UN membership conflict, 
complicating an expansive ICJ decision in the Kosovo case.  One of the 
earliest cases of the exercise of ICJ advisory jurisdiction was Conditions of 
Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (1948) 
(Admissions Case).263  The question posed was whether UN Member States 
could condition their consent to the admission of other states to the UN on 
conditions not found within the UN Charter.264  The ICJ concludes that the 
conditions for membership laid out in Article 4 of the UN Charter “constitute 
an exhaustive enumeration” and that those conditions are both sufficient and 
necessary for UN membership.265  It affirmatively denies that Member States 
could deny membership on the basis of alternative political considerations, 
finding that such considerations lead to an impermissible “indefinite and 
practically unlimited power of discretion.”266  Contrary to this ruling, 
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Member States during the Cold War used political considerations to block 
membership of countries aligned with one power or another, as was 
demonstrated in 1955.267 
Therefore, the ICJ could recognize the practical difficulties of 
acknowledging that Kosovo had acceded to a sovereign state.  Despite the 
acceptance of the declaratory theory, the constitutive theory holds 
considerable sway in state practice; individual states still have some form of 
independent, sovereign authority to impart statehood on external political 
entities.268  Individual, sovereign states oppose any ICJ action to remove that 
authority from them.269  So long as Russia opposed Kosovo UN membership 
on political grounds, Kosovo is barred from one of the most powerful 
symbols of modern statehood: collective recognition by UN membership.  If 
the ICJ declared a Kosovar right to secession based on remedial grounds, it 
could be interpreted as denying the sovereign states’ political right to 
recognize, and to withhold recognition, in favor of a legal and objective right 
to secession.  Therefore, following Lauterpacht’s guidelines of judicial 
caution,270 it declined to rule so expansively, lest its ruling be disregarded 
entirely. 
C.  Effectivity 
The most problematic of doctrines regarding self-determination and 
secession that the ICJ faces is likely the effectivity principle.  The Canadian 
Supreme Court, in its Reference re Secession opinion, defines the effectivity 
principle as an illegal act that “may eventually acquire legal status if, as a 
matter of empirical fact, it is recognized on the international plane.”271  
International recognition of an entity’s statehood only has legal effect once a 
political entity has achieved secession as a political fact.272  The effectivity 
principle is a corollary of the constitutive theory of recognition.273  If an act 
of secession is “successful in the streets, [it] might well lead to the creation 
of a new state.”274 
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The Canadian Supreme Court rejected the effectivity principle argument 
for the secession of Quebec, asserting that it did not provide an ex ante 
explanation or justification of an act.275  However, the legality of an act of 
secession is not a precondition for international recognition of that new 
state.276  For example, the Canadian Supreme Court, in its criticism of the 
effectivity principle, argues that states are less likely to recognize a new state 
if it separated from its parent state in violation of municipal law or in breach 
of a good-faith duty to negotiate from that parent state.277  Thus nations are 
less likely to recognize Kosovo if the declaration of independence violated 
the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under SCR 1244,278 or 
a violation of the Constitutional Framework.279 
If the ICJ expressly accepted this theory, it would directly contradict the 
dozens of states that recognized Kosovo prior to the Kosovo Opinion’s 
issue.280  The Canadian Supreme Court’s pronouncement that states would 
withhold recognition in cases of illegal state formation is an opinion rather 
than a statement of law, and has little legal precedent.281  Therefore, the 
critical point of Reference re Secession’s discussion of the effectivity 
principle is this: while a unilateral declaration of independence and secession 
by Quebec might eventually acquire legal status, the success of that 
geopolitical process would not support a doctrine that a unilateral declaration 
of independence would be legal even if the subsequent secession is 
recognized.282 
The ICJ faces the same problem with effectivity as it does with 
recognition.283  A ruling declaring the February 2008 UDI affirmatively legal 
or illegal would attack the effectivity principle.  This would fly in the face of 
state practice and directly contradict the Lotus principle.  By finding that the 
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authors of the UDI were not restricted by SCR 1244,284 the ICJ permits the 
effectivity principle to govern the declaration and later political acts by 
individual actors.  In effect, the ICJ acknowledges that the best test for the 
legality of Kosovo’s independence is not in the courtroom, but in the 
diplomatic arena, and affirms that the effectivity principle governs this sort 
of action.285 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The remedial declaration of independence is a new instrument for 
territories seeking self-determination.  The ICJ could not use the Kosovo 
case to fully confirm the doctrine of remedial secession.  Doing so would 
step on the toes of preexisting state power and privilege.  The ICJ, by 
explicitly denying that it was building a doctrine of remedial secession, was 
allowed to take a tiny step forward.  The Kosovo case allowed the Assembly 
of Kosovo, confirmed by the Special Representative’s silence and 
encouraged by international indecisiveness, to make the February 2008 UDI.  
The ICJ left the political ramifications of the UDI to the international 
community.  It was institutionally barred from doing otherwise. 
The Kosovo Opinion will not be known as a seminal case, nor will it be 
fondly remembered for its clarity.  The remedial declaration of independence 
is a compromise, not a definitive doctrine.  However, Quebec separatists now 
know that a remedial and unilateral declaration of independence have not 
been opposed by international law.286  This territory, and others around the 
globe, may learn that they also deserve the protection of the Lotus principle: 
since the ICJ did not say no, it might as well be yes. 
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